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HOW MUCH WILL IT COST? THE “PRICE” OF
PHARMACEUTICAL GAG CLAUSES AND WHY THEIR
PROHIBITION MAY NOT EQUATE TO SAVINGS
Amy Faye Eng*
I. INTRODUCTION
Individuals often perceive pharmacists as trustworthy. A pharmacist
may be responsible for a wide variety of tasks—from keeping a watchful
eye for erroneous dosing to being a source of knowledge on drug
interactions or side effects. Considering the potentially endless list of
interactions between an individual and a pharmacist, a relationship is likely
to form over time, which augments the feeling of trust. Until recently,
however, there was one thing a pharmacist could not be trusted to do: let
you know when you are paying “too much” for your prescription
medication.
Rhode Island Representative Brian Kennedy found himself in a
situation shared by many Americans: at the pharmacy picking up a
prescription.1 The pharmacist filling the prescription happened to be a
friend of Representative Kennedy and discreetly disclosed to the
Representative that he would be charged the drug’s retail price as opposed
to his copay.2 The reason why was simple—the retail price was less than
the copay. 3 The impact of making such a disclosure was more than just a
friend looking out for another. In that single moment, the pharmacist
committed a major transgression and simultaneously catalyzed the proposal
of a new piece of Rhode Island legislation, which was later introduced by
Representative Kennedy.4 The pharmacist, whose identity could not be
*

J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law, concentration in Health Law;
B.A., magna cum laude, 2017, Rutgers University. Special thanks to Professor John Jacobi
for sharing his endless wisdom and helping bring this Comment to life. To the pharmacists
who trusted their stories with a mere law student. And finally, for my family and friends,
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clauses exclusively).
1
Elaine S. Povich, There Might Be a Cheaper Drug, But Pharmacists Can’t Tell You
That, PEW (June 4, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateli
ne/2018/06/04/there-might-be-a-cheaper-drug-but-pharmacists-cant-tell-you-that.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
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shared due to the possibility of retaliation, had breached a “gag clause.”5
The healthcare system in the United States is complex, and while
there are many defining features that make it unlike any other, healthcare in
the United States is arguably best known for being notoriously expensive.6
Consequently, pharmaceutical spending comprises a large part.7 To put it
into perspective, “[t]he United States spends twice as much on healthcare
as 10 other high-income nations,” which includes countries such as the
United Kingdom, Switzerland, Canada, and Japan.8 Of all healthcare
spending in the United States, the pharmaceutical sector compromises
almost fifteen percent.9 Moreover, prescription drug spending has been on
the rise in the United States.10 Needless to say, any conversation regarding
healthcare automatically points to a discussion about the cost of
pharmaceuticals.
The high cost of prescription drugs is a continuously raised issue, and
the need for solutions is never-ending. Part of what makes the matter so
pressing is the inability of many Americans to afford their medication.11 In
5

Id.
See Margot Sanger-Katz, Why is U.S. Health Care So Expensive? Some of the
Reasons You’ve Heard Turn Out to Be Myths, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/upshot/united-states-health-care-resembles-rest-ofworld.html (“There were two areas where the United States was quite different: We pay
substantially higher prices for medical services, including hospitalization, doctors’ visits and
prescription drugs. And our complex payment system causes us to spend far more on
administrative costs.”).
7
Id.
8
Jessica Glenza, Sky-high Prices of Everything Makes US Healthcare the World’s
Most Expensive, GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/mar/13/us-healthcare-costs-causes-drug-prices-salaries.
In 2018, healthcare
spending reached 3.6 trillion dollars, which comes to $11,172 per person. CMS.GOV: CTR.
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2020); Bradley Sawyer & Cynthia Cox, How Does Health Spending in the U.S.
Compare to Other Countries?, PETERSON KAISER: HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-spending-u-s-comparecountries/#item-start. The next highest spending country was Switzerland at $8009 per
person while every country after that spent roughly half, if not less, than the United States.
Id.
9
Nancy L. Yu et al., Spending on Prescription Drugs in the US: Where Does All the
Money Go?, HEALTH AFF. (July 31, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog2
0180726.670593/full/.
10
Allen Coukell & Ian Reynolds, A Look at Drug Spending in the U.S., PEW (Feb. 27,
2018),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2018/02/a-look-atdrug-spending-in-the-us (describing that in 2018, prescription drug spending was expected
to rise more rapidly than any other part of the healthcare sector).
11
See Paulina Firozi, The Health 202: ‘Gag Clauses’ Mean You Might Be Paying More
For Prescription Drugs Than You Need To, WASH. POST: POWERPOST (July 5, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2018/07/05/the6
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recent discussions regarding ways to lower costs for Americans, “gag
clauses” captured national attention.12 Gag clauses are clauses found in
contracts between Pharmacy Benefit Managers (“PBMs”) and
pharmacies.13 These clauses are stipulations put in place by PBMs, which
prohibit pharmacists from notifying consumers of the most cost-efficient
way to procure their medication.14 Generally, this impedes a pharmacist
from telling a consumer that paying out-of-pocket would be cheaper than
processing the payment through the consumer’s insurance plan.15
Until recently, gag clauses were relatively unknown outside of the
industry. Since making their debut in news headlines across the nation,
they have captured widespread public attention and prompted lawmakers to
take action at both the state and federal levels.16 Even President Donald
Trump has commented, brandishing the practice “a total rip-off” and
further indicating, “[W]e are ending it.”17 Since making that statement, the
Trump Administration has achieved its goal of eliminating the use of gag
clauses,18 but the elimination of gag clauses is only a surface level solution
to a much deeper issue regarding the cost of drugs and the role of PBMs.
This Comment will examine PBMs, their use of gag clauses, and the
lessons that can be learned post-gag clause legislation. Specifically, this
Comment will address the various harms consumers face when gag clauses
are permitted and utilized and further explain how these harms are not
isolated incidents but issues pervasive in the PBM system. Essentially,
what has changed with the removal of gag clauses and what more can be
done? The analysis ultimately argues gag clauses were rightfully banned
due to ethical implications and public policy concerns; however, rather than
being viewed as an end, the prohibition of gag clauses should be considered
the first step to amending problematic PBM practices. Gag clauses

health-202-gag-clauses-mean-you-might-be-paying-more-for-prescription-drugs-than-youneed-to/5b3a36ca1b326b3348addc4a/?utm_term=.22255ed87d1e (describing a couple who
could not afford a $111 co-pay for medication).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Robert Pear, Why Your Pharmacist Can’t Tell You That $20 Prescription Could Only
Cost $8, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/24/us/politics/phar
macy-benefit-managers-gag-clauses.html.
15
Id.
16
See id.
17
Katie Thomas, 6 Takeaways from Trump’s Plan to Lower Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES
(May 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/health/trump-drug-prices.html
(statement from President Donald Trump commenting on the use of gag clauses during a
speech addressing prescription drug prices).
18
Dartunorro Clark & Brenda Breslauer, Trump Signs Bill Lifting Pharmacist ‘Gag
Clauses’ on Drug Prices, NBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2018, 3:31 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/white-house/trump-signs-bills-lifting-pharmacist-gag-orders-drug-prices-n918721.
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ultimately harmed consumers and offered little, if any, benefit.
Unfortunately, this is a theme that persists despite the prohibition of gag
clauses.
Part II provides a brief overview of PBMs and describes the supply
chain for how medication reaches a consumer, and more importantly, how
price is determined. Afterward, Part III defines gag clauses and their
function. Part IV then discusses some of the issues associated with gag
clauses and details how they adversely impact consumers. Part V explores
the widespread attention received by gag clauses and analyzes state and
federal legislation prohibiting their use.
Finally, Part VI ends with the position that while gag clauses should
be prohibited and their removal is ultimately a win for lawmakers and
Americans alike, nothing has significantly changed. The gag clause story
reveals deeply entrenched issues in the PBM system; gag clauses are gone,
yet issues regarding fiduciary duties, conflicts of interest, and transparency
still remain.
If lawmakers are genuinely interested in protecting
Americans, they should seek to strengthen gag clause legislation and find
other avenues to further reform the harmful practices of PBMs.
II. BACKGROUND: PBMS, DRUG PRICING, AND THE RISING COST OF
HEALTHCARE
For a drug to reach a consumer, there are several moving parts that
must align. Ideally, a patient goes to his or her doctor, the doctor makes a
diagnosis, the doctor prescribes an appropriate medication, the patient goes
to the pharmacy to have the prescription filled, and the patient receives the
medication. In reality, however, the system may not be so streamline.
Patients must consider whether their insurer covers the prescription,
whether the pharmacy they frequent is in network, and so on. The entire
process may spark endless questions: “who decides what drugs are
included on a formulary?”; “why does a patient need to try several
treatments prior to receiving the medication the physician originally wanted
to prescribe?”; “what is actually the difference between a biosimilar and a
bioequivalent?” While all of these are valid, the most important question
for the purposes of this Comment is: “how much will it cost?”
A. What is a PBM?
PBMs came into existence in the 1970s to serve as “fiscal
intermediaries by adjudicating prescription drug claims by paper and then,
in the 1980s, electronically.”19 Historically, the role of the PBM was to
19

Allison Dabbs Garrett & Robert Garis, Leveling the Playing Field in the Pharmacy
Benefit Management Industry, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 33, 34 (2007).
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process prescriptions.20 The process began when a patient dropped his or
her prescription off at the pharmacy to be filled.21 The pharmacy would
then contact the PBM to ensure the patient had coverage, whether the
prescription was covered by the plan, the copay amount, and whether
further authorization was required.22 Once the prescription was filled, the
pharmacy would contact the PBM with the patient’s information, and the
PBM would then approve or disapprove the transaction.23 After, the PBM
would seek payment from the insurer and transfer the proper payment
amount to the pharmacy.24
Since its inception, the role of the PBM has changed greatly. From its
arguably “humble” beginnings of “simply processing prescription
transactions,” PBMs are now tasked with “managing the pharmacy benefit
for health plans.”25 Individual insurers seek to control costs yet they do not
always have the necessary expertise to effectively negotiate. 26 As a result,
insurers have turned to PBMs to handle drug purchasing.27 PBMs have
significant buying power and “act like giant buying networks for drugs,
representing consumers from multiple employers and insurers.”28 Thus,
insurers usually opt to contract with a PBM rather than internally manage
drug procurement.29 Unlike the insurer, PBMs have standing within the
pharmaceutical industry and the power to negotiate.30
PBMs are best known as the entity that negotiates rebates and
discounts with pharmaceutical manufacturers. It is argued that, through
their efforts, “PBMs save consumers and third-parties that pay for

20

Id.
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Garrett & Garis, supra note 19.
26
Ruth Barber Timm, The Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine and the
Pharmaceutical Benefit Management Industry: A Proposed Exception to the Copperweld
Holding, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 309, 316 (1996).
27
Id.
28
John Arnold, Are Pharmacy Benefit Managers the Good Guys or Bad Guys of Drug
Pricing?, STAT (Aug. 27. 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/08/27/pharmacy-benefitmanagers-good-or-bad/.
29
Id.
30
Cole Werble, Pharmacy Benefit Managers, HEALTH AFF. (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171409.000178/full/.
See also Robert
Calandra, PBMS: New Power and Influence, MANAGED CARE (April 5, 2015),
https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2015/4/pbms-new-power-and-influence (“The
more members a PBM represents, the bigger its buying power. The bigger its buying
power, the larger its influence on the marketplace. The larger its influence . . . well, you get
the idea.”).
21
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prescription drugs billions of dollars each year.”31 These savings are
achieved through various means. For instance, a PBM may be in charge of
crafting the formulary, which gives the PBM immense leverage in
negotiations.32 The ability to craft the formulary is powerful and can affect
patient care.33 A formulary is a list of preferred drugs a plan covers.34 Plan
participants are incentivized to use medications included on the formulary
because these medications are generally cheaper.35 This, in turn, increases
consumer demand for particular products and results in significant sales for
the respective drug manufacturers.36 As a result, drug manufacturers want
their products on the formulary, and since they are competing with every
other manufacturer, they are willing to offer discounts and rebates to appeal
to the formulary drafter, i.e. the PBM.37 Ultimately, PBMs have immense
influence over which drugs consumers have access to, the means in which
consumers are able to procure them, and how much they will cost.38
Additionally, PBMs are powerful because they are largely underregulated and are able to partake in conduct that can impair, rather than
enhance, the value of competition in the retail drug market.39 PBMs have
amassed large patient networks, and in order for a manufacturer or
31
Joana Shepherd, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: The Regulation of Pharmacy
Benefit Managers by a Market Advisory, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2 (2013).
32
Garrett & Garis, supra note 19. Being able to craft a formulary gives a PBM crucial
leverage over the system because a PBM has the ability to “exclude hundreds of drugs” and
show preference for a select few. David Dayen, The Hidden Monopolies That Raise Drug
Prices, AM. PROSPECT LONGFORM (Mar. 18, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/hiddenmonopolies-raise-drug-prices.
33
See Mark A. Buckles, Electronic Formulary Management and Medicaid:
Maximizing Economic Efficiency and Quality of Care in the Age of Electronic Prescribing,
11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 179, 183 (2000) (“Plans encourage physicians . . . to adhere to
formularies by linking their compensation or status in the plan to their prescribing practices
or simply by making it more costly for patients if physicians deviate from the formulary.”).
34
Shepherd, supra note 31, at 5; Michael Bihari, Understanding Your Health Plan
Drug Formulary, VERYWELL HEALTH (June 24, 2019) (“A drug formulary is a list of
prescription drugs, both generic and brand name, that are preferred by your health plan”
with the intention of steering patients towards “the least costly medications that are
sufficiently effective for treating [the] health condition.”).
35
Shepherd, supra note 31, at 5.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 2 (“They [PBMs] influence how much consumers pay for drugs, which
pharmacies they use, and even which drugs they take.”); Jane Horvath, Pharmacy Benefit
Manager Model Legislation: Questions and Answers, NASHP (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://nashp.org/pharmacy-benefit-manager-model-legislation-questions-and-answers/ (“If
a manufacturer’s drug is not in a formulary, insurers won’t cover the drug and physicians
won’t prescribe it, so PBMs have great leverage when negotiating prices.”).
39
See generally Garrett & Garis, supra note 19, at 34–35 (“Over the past decade,
significant changes have occurred in the PBM industry, but regulation of the PBMs has not
kept pace with those changes.”).
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pharmacy to have access to that network, it must contract with the PBM.40
Alternatively, to remain attractive to manufacturers and effectively
negotiate, PBMs are motivated to grow their networks.41 As a result,
PBMs have resorted to consolidation.42
The three largest PBMs,
sometimes referred to as the “Big Three,” are Express Scripts, CVS
Caremark, and OptumRx.43 It is estimated that these three PBMs control
roughly seventy-five to eighty percent of market share, which translates to
180 million prescription drug customers.44 With the exception of Express
Scripts being a standalone PBM, CVS Caremark is aligned with the major
drug retailer CVS Health, and OptumRX partners with the insurer
UnitedHealth.45 All, however, have been parties in mergers and retain
significant control of the PBM market.46
While PBMs should help consumers, it is unclear whether they truly
achieve this goal. Given their role as masters of the formulary and the
sheer volume of individuals managed, PBMs significantly impact
consumers. Primarily, this impact is realized through rebates and
discounts.47 This model, utilizing rebates and discounts to raise revenue,
has led to concerns regarding possible “perverse impact[s] on pharmacy
costs and patient out-of-pocket costs.”48 Ultimately, when it comes to
consumers, PBMs may actually be doing more harm than good.
B. Following the Cost (and the Pill) to the Consumer
For a consumer who obtains a prescription drug at the pharmacy (as
opposed to receiving it directly from a physician in an outpatient setting),49
40

Dayen, supra note 32.
Werble, supra note 30, at 2.
42
Id.
43
Garrett & Garis, supra note 19, at 36.
44
Garrett & Garis, supra note 19, at 34. Another way to look at this: “Within the
United States, approximately two-thirds of all prescriptions filled pass through the hands of
PBMs in one way or another.” Id.
45
Werble, supra note 30, at 2.
46
Evan Sweeney, Lawmakers Ask FTC for Retrospective Review of PBM Mergers,
FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Jul. 30, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/payer/ho
use-energy-and-commerce-ftc-pbm-mergers-healthcare-costs (“CVS Health bought
Caremark in 2007, Express Scripts bought Medco Health Solutions in 2012 and
UnitedHealth bought Catamaran in 2015.”). Further, CVS is looking to acquire Aetna, and
Cigna is looking to acquire Express Scripts. Id.
47
See discussion infra Section II.B.
48
Horvath, supra note 38.
49
Drugs can be obtained at a pharmacy but can also be obtained directly from a health
care provider. See A Tangled Web: An Examination of the Drug Supply and Payment
Chains (June 2018) [hereinafter A Tangled Web], https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/medi
a/doc/A%20Tangled%20Web.pdf. For example, a patient may receive care from the
outpatient department of a hospital, a physician’s office, or an outpatient clinic and receive
41
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that drug has traveled from the manufacturer that made the drug, all the
way to the pharmacy that has the ability to dispense the drug.50 Yet
following the movement of a pill from the manufacturer to the consumer is
much less complex than following the exchange of money necessary to
move the drug through the supply chain.
The decision as to what a consumer will pay at the pharmacy counter
depends on a complicated chain of negotiations largely influenced by the
passing along of discounts and rebates.51 A manufacturer establishes a list
price, also known as the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (“WAC”), which “is
intended to capture the price a manufacturer would charge a drug
wholesaler or other direct purchaser before any discounts, rebates or other
price reductions.”52 This is the “sticker price.”53 The sticker price,
however, is virtually never paid due to various financial incentives offered
by manufacturers in an effort to stimulate demand.54 The manufacturer
sells to a wholesale distributor, who pays a negotiated price, and in turn,
the wholesale distributor will sell to a pharmacy, who pays a different
negotiated price.55 It is during these separate negotiations that discounts
and rebates come into consideration.56
PBMs are the intermediary between the manufacturer and
pharmacy—they negotiate price and conduct quality and utilization
management screens on the drugs being purchased.57 The price is then
passed to the consumer who may use his or her insurance, whether it be
public or private coverage, to help pay for the drug.58 Every insurance plan
medication directly from the health care provider without ever stepping foot inside a
pharmacy. Id. at vii. In this situation, the drug is made by the manufacturer, sent to a
wholesale distributor, and then makes it way to the health care provider. Id. This practice is
sometimes referred to as “direct dispensing,” “point-of-care dispensing,” or “in-office
dispensing.” This Comment will not explore the administering of pharmaceuticals through
the outpatient channel.
50
Follow the Pill: Understanding the U.S. Commercial Pharmaceutical Supply Chain,
HEALTH STRATEGIES CONSULTANCY LLC 1 (Mar. 2005), https://avalere.com/research/docs/F
ollow_the_Pill.pdf.
51
Henry C. Eickelberg, The Prescription Drug Supply Chain “Black Box” How It
Works and Why You Should Care, AM. HEALTH POL’Y INST. 9 (2015),
http://www.americanhealthpolicy.org/Content/documents/resources/December%202015_A
HPI%20Study_Understanding_the_Pharma_Black_Box.pdf.
52
Id. (emphasis omitted).
53
Id.
54
Id. This can be likened to buying a car. A sticker price exists, but more often than
not, that price will not be paid by the consumer.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Eickelberg, supra note 51, at 7.
58
See Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for
a More Functional System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2005) (describing various
means of accessing health care).
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is unique, but generally, the insurance company and/or PBM will have
contracts in place to reduce the cost of drugs for plan participants.59 This
is, of course, assuming that the health coverage includes pharmacy
coverage.60 If a consumer does not have pharmacy coverage, he or she will
be charged a cash price.61
As the middlemen, PBMs directly influence a consumer’s out-ofpocket costs. Cost is contingent on how “well” the PBM is able to negotiate
a rebate or discount, but more importantly, cost is ultimately decided by the
price the PBM chooses to charge the consumer.62 For instance, a
manufacturer may charge $10 for a pill that costs 50¢ to produce. The
PBM negotiates and pays $3, and to make a profit, the PBM will set the
price at $5. The consumer and their insurer will then pay the $5, and the
PBM makes a profit of $2. While $2 may seem inconsequential, it adds up
in the aggregate. Moreover, the split in price is not always just $5. It can
be a much larger and sometimes even shocking amount. Take for example,
the 2016 situation with Mylan’s EpiPen. A two-pack EpiPen costs about
$2 to manufacture.63 In 2007, Mylan was charging $100, and by 2016, the
price exceeded $600 without any substantive justification for the price
hike.64 The high price resulted in significant out-of-pocket costs for
families, many of which could not afford the life-saving medication.65 On
a $600 EpiPen, a PBM was estimated to receive roughly $300 per
prescription.66 PBMs faced backlash for their failure to keep costs down,
59

Kimberly Amadeo, How Health Insurance Works, BALANCE (Sept. 25, 2018),
https://www.thebalance.com/how-does-health-insurance-work-3306069 (“Health insurance
is necessary for Americans to pay for the high cost of healthcare. . . . Health insurance
companies provide lots of choices.”).
60
See Steve Vernon, Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage: You May Need a New
Plan, CBS NEWS (Sept. 26, 2018; 1:23 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/medicareprescription-drug-coverage-open-enrollment-starts-oct-1-how-a-new-plan-can-save-money/
(explaining Medicare coverage may not include prescription drug coverage, which would
“potentially save hundreds or even thousands of dollars.”). The same is true for private
insurance, and an individual’s private insurer may or may not include prescription drug
coverage. For example, Blue Cross Blue Shield directs participants to check their individual
plan for coverage information. How Do I Know My Plan Covers My Prescription Drug?,
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD NETWORK MICH., https://www.bcbsm.com/index/healthinsurance-help/faqs/plan-types/pharmacy/know-if-plan-covers-prescription-drug.html (last
visited Oct. 24, 2018).
61
Eickelberg, supra note 51, at 10.
62
See Jessica Wapner, How Prescription Drugs Get Their Prices, Explained,
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 17, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/prescription-drug-prici
ng-569444.
63
Michelle M. Mello, What Makes Ensuring Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs
the Hardest Problem in Health Policy?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2273, 2274 (2018).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 2274–75. EpiPens treat anaphylaxis. Id. at 2273 n.2.
66
David Balto, How PBMs Make the Drug Price Problem Worse, HILL (Aug. 31, 2016,
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especially when it seemed they pursued profit at the expense of
consumers—consumers they were supposed to be serving and negotiating
on behalf of.67 Undeniably, something went wrong in the EpiPen situation,
and consumers paid the price.68
Consumers arguably have the most at stake; they use the medication,
yet the system does not offer them a voice nor does it allow them an
opportunity to make decisions about care—instead, consumers “wait to see
what their physicians prescribe and what their insurance will pay for.”69
Because PBMs make their profit depending on the difference in cost
between what they pay and what they charge, PBMs are incentivized to
pass on higher costs to consumers.70 While the PBM may be saving the
consumer from paying the list price—the price that nobody ever pays—the
PBM may not be passing on the negotiated savings to consumers in a
meaningful way.
III. DEFINING THE “GAG CLAUSE”
Gag clauses are found in contracts between PBMs and pharmacies and
constrain a pharmacist’s ability to communicate price alternatives to a
consumer.71 Pharmacies contract with PBMs in order to access the patients
within the PBM’s network.72 In order to make a profit, a pharmacy needs
to have customers, and in order to have customers, the pharmacy must
engage with a PBM who is the gatekeeper to a plan’s participants. When a
pharmacy dispenses medication to a consumer, the pharmacy is at a
monetary loss until the PBM issues a reimbursement.73 Thus, pharmacies
5:51 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/294025-how-pbms-make-thedrug-price-problem-worse.
67
Id.
68
The EpiPen situation is still playing out, and the PBMs who were involved in the
scandal are currently involved in litigation regarding their involvement. In re EpiPen
(Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices & Antitrust Litig., 336 F. Supp. 3d
1256 (D. Kan. 2018); see also Carmen Castro-Pagan, CVS, UnitedHealth, Others Must
Defend EpiPen Pricing Suit, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 29, 2018, 8:53 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employee-benefits/cvs-unitedhealth-others-must-defendepipen-pricing-suit (“The insureds who last year sued the nation’s largest pharmacy benefit
managers—including Caremark, Express Scripts, Optum, and Prime Therapeutics LLC—
over EpiPen’s pricing scheme have alleged sufficient facts to establish their right to bring
the lawsuit . . . .”).
69
Wapner, supra note 62.
70
Balto, supra note 66 (“The higher the price, the higher the rebate—and [the PBM]
walk[s] away with a bigger slice of the pie.”).
71
Matthew Perrone, To Get Around Pharmacy Gag Rules, Ask About Drug Costs,
MED. XPRESS (June 6, 2018), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-06-pharmacy-gagdrug.html.
72
See supra text accompanying note 40.
73
See Follow the Dollar: Understanding How the Pharmaceutical Distribution and
Payment System Shapes the Prices of Brand Medicines, PHRMA 1, 4 (Nov. 2017),
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rely on PBMs to access consumers and receive payment.74 As part of the
agreement allowing a pharmacy to work with the PBM’s patients, a
pharmacy is likely to agree to various conditions such as a gag clause,
which “contractually obligate[s a pharmacist] to keep quiet regarding
possible patient cost savings” or risk losing the network contract with the
PBM.75
Often, gag clauses prevent pharmacists from notifying consumers they
“could save money by paying cash for prescription drugs rather than using
their health insurance.”76 This situation plays out in the following
hypothetical: Jane Doe needs a prescription medication. It costs the
pharmacy $10 to stock the medication, and Jane’s copay is $20. If Jane
opts not to process the payment through her insurance, she would pay $10
and have an immediate savings of $10. If the pharmacist is subject to a gag
clause, he or she will be unable to notify Jane of the price difference. As a
result, Jane will have to pay the higher price of $20 unless Jane knows to
ask whether a lower price is available. One pharmacist describes this
situation as: “[If] I see on my screen that if you pay the cash price it would
actually be cheaper for you than if you were to pay with your insurance, I
can’t tell you unless you specifically ask me about it.”77
Sometimes gag clauses are expressly stated in the contract.78 More
commonly, however, the clauses are obscured or hidden in “broad
confidentiality rules” that employ “broad and nebulous confidentiality
verbiage.”79 While the clauses generally bar pharmacists from initiating
conversations about cheaper alternatives, a gag clause may not be a
complete prohibition on the information depending on the specific
contract.80 Thus, if a consumer asks his or her pharmacist directly for a
drug’s cash price or asks if there is a cheaper alternative, the gag clause is
unlikely to interfere with the pharmacist being able to answer.81
Conversely, a pharmacist beholden to a gag clause will never be able to
http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/files/dmfile/Follow-the-Dollar-Report.pdf.
74
See Jeffrey S. Baird, What to Know About Working with PBMs, PHARMACY TIMES
(Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/what-to-know-about-working-withpbms (“[T]he PBM ‘possesses the pharmacy’s money.’”).
75
Lynn Shapiro Snyder et al., New Federal Laws Banning “Gag Clauses” in the
Pharmacy, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.healthlawadvisor.com/201
8/10/19/new-federal-laws-banning-gag-clauses-in-the-pharmacy/.
76
Pear, supra note 14.
77
Firozi, supra note 11 (Anthony Reznik, director of government affairs for the
Independent Pharmacy Alliance, on gag clauses).
78
Id.
79
Id. (explaining it would be rare to see an over prohibition that said, “Though shall
not tell the patient the true negotiated price”).
80
Perrone, supra note 71.
81
Id.

ENG(DO NOT DELETE)

1190

4/22/2020 2:31 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1179

initiate a conversation about cost.82
Even if consumers have the ability to initiate a conversation with their
pharmacist about cost alternatives, many do not. 83 Most consumers do not
think of the cost of medication as being “negotiable”—much less know
about the clauses—and would never think to ask.84 “As a consumer you
would have no idea how it works . . . . Even if you were aware of the issue,
it would be hard to know when the person across the counter says, ‘This is
$20.’ They would pay the $20, because what is the option?”85 And this
makes sense. It would be counterintuitive for consumers to assume there is
a cheaper option when the role of insurance is to lower costs.86
Gag clauses are particularly problematic for vulnerable communities
like senior citizens who are more likely to take larger amounts of
prescription medication due to age-related health factors.87 The clauses
also affect individuals who have plans with higher cost-sharing
responsibilities because a gag clause could result in the consumer’s copay
being higher than the retail price of the drug.88 Nevertheless, gag clauses
have the ability to affect anyone. Anyone who goes to a pharmacy to
procure medicine, whether it is once a day or once every ten years, could
potentially be affected.

82

Id.
Jared S. Hopkins, Pharmacists May Soon Be Able to Tell You the Cheapest Way to
Get
Prescriptions,
BLOOMBERG
(Sept.
25,
2018,
6:20
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-25/pharmacy-gag-clause-on-cheaperdrug-prices-barred-by-congress (“Most patients never realize there’s a cheaper cash price
because of clauses in contracts between pharmacies and PBMs that bar the drugstore from
telling people there’s a cheaper way to pay.”).
84
Id.
85
Povich, supra note 1 (Richard Cauchi, the health program director for the National
Conference of State Legislatures, on gag clauses).
86
Hopkins, supra note 83 (“Insurance is intended to save consumers money . . . . Who
would think that using your debit card to buy your prescription drugs would be less
expensive than using your insurance card? It’s counterintuitive.”); Sen. Susan Collins
(@SenatorCollins), TWITTER (Oct. 10, 2018, 4:37 PM),
https://twitter.com/senatorcollins/status/1050123175688847362?lang=en.
87
See Susan Morse, House Passes Bills Prohibiting Pharmacy Gag Clauses on Drug
Price, HEALTHCARE FIN. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/ho
use-passes-bills-prohibiting-pharmacy-gag-clauses-drug-prices (“Nearly 60 percent of
Americans, including roughly 90 percent of seniors, take prescription
drugs. A study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that 23
percent of prescriptions filled through insurance ended up costing more for customers than
if they had paid out-of-pocket.”)
88
Mary Kane, New Laws Lift ‘Gag Clauses’ on Pharmacists, KIPLINGER (Oct. 10,
2018),
https://www.kiplinger.com/article/insurance/T039-C000-S009-new-laws-lift-gagclauses-on-pharmacists.html (“[I]f you pay a hefty co-pay, it might cost less to pay for a
drug yourself . . . .”).
83
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Without doubt, gag clauses are implemented to benefit PBMs, and
PBMs offer several justifications for their utilization. First, PBMs argue
the money collected is reallocated to help keep costs down as well as slow
premium increases.89 Second, PBMs argue they have the right to pocket
excess payments because generally, consumers pay less due to the efforts
of the PBM.90 In other words, PBMs “make less than they are requesting
so it’s justified on the rarer occasions that they make more than the list
price.”91 Third, PBMs argue there is a need to ensure consumers stay
within the system. If consumers are free to choose when they will and will
not use their insurance, PBMs are unable to predict expenses, and they
become susceptible to only paying for high-cost medications without an
opportunity to recoup funds on lower cost prescriptions.92 Arguably, the
lack of certainty would lead to higher costs for everyone in order to buffer
the risk.
There is also disagreement regarding how widespread gag clauses
actually are and whether or not they truly impact consumers. On the
subject, a spokesman for Express Scripts indicated, “We do not engage in
this anti-consumer practice and are working constructively with state and
federal policymakers to ban this practice.”93 Likewise, a statement from
CVS Health noted, “CVS Health’s own pharmacy benefit manager, CVS
Caremark, does not engage in the practice of preventing pharmacists from
informing patients of the cash price of a prescription drug, known as ‘gag
clauses.’”94 Conversely, there are countless accounts from pharmacists
89

See Sean Dickson & Alisa Chester, Policymakers Seek Ways to Lower Drug Costs at
the Pharmacy Counter, PEW (July 12, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/articles/2018/07/12/policymakers-seek-ways-to-lower-drug-costs-at-the-pharmacycounter.
90
Letters to the Editor, How Those Pharmacy Gag Clauses Are Justified, NJ.COM (Oct.
19, 2018), https://www.nj.com/hudson/2018/10/how_those_pharmacy_gag_clauses_are_jus
tified_lette.html.
91
Id.
92
This could be compared to the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate. The
individual mandate was implemented to compel Americans to purchase insurance in order to
spread cost and prevent adverse selection. Alberto R. Gonzales & Donald B. Stuart, Two
Years Later and Counting: The Implications of the Supreme Court’s Taxing Power Decision
on the Goals of the Affordable Care Act, 17 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 219, 222 (2014);
see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 548 (2012). The same could
be said in this situation. PBMs want to ensure that individuals continue to process payments
through the insurer so costs can remain lower for everyone overall.
93
Firozi, supra note 11 (Phil J. Blando, spokesman for Express Scripts, in a statement
to Health 202).
94
Id. (CVS Health in a March 2018 Statement on its website); CVS Caremark Does
Not Have “Gag” Clauses, CVSHEALTH, https://cvshealth.com/thought-leadership/cvscaremark-facts/cvs-caremark-does-not-have-gag-clauses (“[A]t CVS Caremark, we do not
and have never prevented pharmacies in our network from discussing the availability of a
lower cash price with plan members.” (emphasis omitted)) (last visited Jan. 7, 2020).
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who indicate gag clauses are an everyday impediment to the work that they
do.95 In 2016, an industry survey found “nearly 20 percent of pharmacists
were limited by gag clauses more than 50 times per month.”96 In 2013, it
was estimated that there were roughly $135 million in overpayments due to
gag clauses.97 Regardless of which side of the debate is “correct,” gag
clauses have been prevalent enough to warrant widespread attention and
were framed by lawmakers as being a significant problem.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH GAG CLAUSES
Those who have never heard of gag clauses usually react with
discomfort or disgust. When a system is supposed to help by lowering outof-pocket costs for consumers, it is unnerving to find that the exact
opposite is occurring.98 Ultimately, gag clauses affect the way in which
consumers are able to interact with pharmacists, thereby interfering with a
relationship that otherwise functions on trust.99 As a consequence, not only
do gag clauses raise concerns about saving money, they also highlight
ethical and public policy implications.
A. Fiduciary Duties
Gag clauses reveal an issue with fiduciary duties, specifically in
regard to who owes them and who does not. The fiduciary duties imposed
on pharmacists do not directly require any sort of disclosure related to
95

I spoke with several pharmacists. All of them were very aware of gag clauses and
could cite to instances in which a gag clause had affected the way they interacted with a
consumer. Overwhelmingly, it seemed that gag clauses had a negative impact on consumer
interactions.
96
Collins, McCaskill, Stabenow, Barrasso, Cassidy Bill to Prohibit “Gag Clauses”
That Cause Consumers to Overpay for Prescriptions Clears Key Senate Hurdle, SUSAN
COLLINS: U.S. SENATOR ME. (July 25, 2018, 10:52 AM), https://www.collins.senate.gov/ne
wsroom/collins-mccaskill-stabenow-barrasso-cassidy-bill-prohibit-%E2%80%9Cgagclauses%E2%80%9D-cause-consumers.
97
Id. Overpayments are the result of copays being more than the total cost of the
medication, which means insurance does not need to contribute any payment. Karen Van
Nuys et al., Overpaying for Prescription Drugs: The Copay Clawback Phenomenon, USC
SCHAFFER 1, 1 (2018). These overpayments are pocketed by PBMs and are referred to as
“clawbacks.” Id. Clawbacks are a separate but generally interrelated issue to gag clauses.
98
Brittany Hoffman-Eubanks, The Role of Pharmacy Benefit Managers in American
Health Care: Pharmacy Concerns and Perspectives: Part 1, PHARMACY TIMES (Nov. 14,
2017),
https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/the-role-of-pharmacy-benefit-mangers-inamerican-health-care-pharmacy-concerns-and-perspectives-part-1 (“To address these
increases in costs related to prescription drugs, private employer groups, individual States,
and the federal government[ ] have utilized the services of pharmacy benefit managers.”).
99
Ryan Marotta, Pharmacists Remain Among Most Trusted and Ethical Professionals,
PHARMACY TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/pharmacistsremain-among-most-trusted-and-ethical-professionals (citing a Gallup poll, which listed
pharmacists as ranked amongst the most honest and ethical professionals).
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methods of prescription payment; however, pharmacists do have other
fiduciary duties. During their training, pharmacists are taught ethics, and
there is a certain ethical norm expected of pharmacists by society as health
care professionals.100 As such, the limitation placed on pharmacists via gag
clauses is counterproductive to their role as fiduciaries. “A fiduciary has
‘duties involving good faith, trust, special confidence, and candor towards
another,’” and the specific duties are defined by the specific relationship
between the parties.101 Arguably, the most well-known fiduciary obligation
in the medical profession is the Hippocratic Oath.102 Pharmacists are
administered a similar oath called the “Oath of a Pharmacist,” which is
curated by the American Pharmacists Association.103 Much like the
Hippocratic Oath, the Oath of a Pharmacist describes a pharmacist’s duty
to help patients and hold high standards.104
The problem with gag clauses is that they interfere with a
pharmacists’ ability to help the consumer. The consumer is harmed
tangibly in that he or she is unable to save money but also intangibly in that
the relationship between the pharmacist and the consumer is strained.105
100
Courts have also found that pharmacists have fiduciary duties imposed by law. The
Supreme Court of New York found that pharmacists are “responsible for collecting
otherwise confidential medical information and providing advice to customers.”
Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (Sup. Ct. 2001). The Court ultimately
outlined a duty of confidentiality, which was implicated when the defendant in this case
transferred customer information without the customer’s knowledge or consent. Id.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed that pharmacists have a duty to
counsel, which may extend to a duty to warn in instances of changes in dosage. Jesse C.
Vivian, Duty to Warn With No Directions for Use, U.S. PHARMACIST (Feb. 17, 2012),
https://www.uspharmacist.com/article/duty-to-warn-with-no-directions-for-use; see also
Nail v. Publix Super Mkts., 72 So. 3d 608, 614, 616 (Ala. 2011).
101
Julia A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Gag
Clauses in Physician Contracts, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 433, 456 (1996).
102
See Greek Medicine: The Hippocratic Oath, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED.,
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html. The Hippocratic Oath establishes a
physician duty as a healer obligated to help the patient first and foremost while also
maintain the interests of society and self. See also Rachel Hajar, The Physician’s Oath:
Historical Perspectives, 18 HEART VIEWS 154, 156 (2017).
103
Oath of a Pharmacist, AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N, https://www.pharmacist.com/oathpharmacist (last accessed Jan. 7, 2020).
104
Id.
105
One pharmacist explained to me how he would decide to go against the gag clause.
Depending on whether the individual was a long-term customer and could be trusted not to
contact his or her insurer to ask why their price was “higher,” which would ultimately get
the pharmacist in trouble due to the gag clause, the pharmacist would be willing to disclose
the price difference. According to the pharmacist, he did not have any “official” fiduciary
obligation to the individual—in fact, the duty was contractually owed to the PBM—but he
felt it was worthwhile to act based on the trust relationship and the best interest of the
consumer. For those he opted against helping, it was merely business and nothing personal.
He also indicated the fiduciary duty that should be owed is the one from the PBM to the
consumer.
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This relationship is important because there is a potentially large societal
cost if citizens are unable to trust individuals who provide care.106
“Patients are more likely to open up and disclose information if they trust
their pharmacist[,]” and a better quality interaction leads to better care.107
Gag clauses implicate a pharmacist’s fiduciary obligations, but they also
present another dilemma: PBMs are tasked with lowering costs for
consumers yet gag clauses achieve the exact opposite. The logical followup question: how does this happen when PBMs have a fiduciary obligation
to protect consumers? As the gag clause situation reveals, PBMs owe very
few duties to consumers, which ultimately harms the consumer.108
B. Conflicts of Interest
Gag clauses also show how the PBM system is riddled with conflicts
of interest. A “[c]onflict of interest describes a situation in which a person
is or appears to be at risk of acting in a biased way because of personal
interests.”109 Gag clauses put pharmacists in a position where they must
choose between appeasing a PBM and acting in self-interest or helping the
consumer by letting him or her know about a cheaper option and
jeopardizing the pharmacy’s contract with the PBM. One main function of
PBMs is to forward money from the health plan to the pharmacy.110
Pharmacists, especially independent pharmacists, often rely on the money
from PBMs—”participation in PBM networks is the lifeblood of
independent pharmacy revenue.”111 As such, there is financial pressure
pushing against a pharmacist’s willingness to counsel a consumer in the
face of a gag clause.112 A consumer may automatically assume the
pharmacist is working on his or her behalf, unaware that the pharmacist is
really allegiant to the PBM and the preservation of self due to a gag clause.
106
See Maria Allison & Betty Chaar, How to Build and Maintain Trust with Patients,
PHARMACEUTICAL J. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/pharmacylearning-centre/how-to-build-and-maintain-trust-withpatients/20201862.article?firstPass=false.
107
Id.
108
See discussion infra Section VI.B.1.
109
Christopher C. Muth, Conflicts of Interest in Medicine, 317 JAMA 1812, 1812
(2017).
110
Garrett & Garis, supra note 19, at 34.
111
Jonathan L. Swichar & Bradley A. Wasser, Pharmacy Fights Back Against PBM
Termination Notice, DUANE MORRIS (Nov. 2017),
https://www.duanemorris.com/articles/pharmacy_fights_back_against_pbm_termination_no
tice_1117.html.
112
An independent pharmacist shared with me how crippling it can be to upset a PBM.
As a small pharmacy, much of the pharmacist’s income could be dependent on PBM
payments so from a financial standpoint, there is no benefit to helping a consumer by going
against a gag clause at the expense of severing ties with the PBM. At the end of the day, the
consumer does not keep the lights on—the PBM does.

ENG(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

4/22/2020 2:31 PM

COMMENT

1195

Also, depending on the contract, PBMs may have the power to terminate
without cause.113 In a situation where PBMs retain so much power, it is
unlikely a pharmacist will be willing to put a relationship he or she heavily
relies on at risk.
The utilization of gag clauses by PBMs highlights a flaw in the
system where financial incentives are misaligned with what is best for
consumers. Like any business, PBMs only profit when consumers use their
services, and gag clauses were a way to ensure consumers would not stray.
While gag clauses are gone, the system remains, and once again,
consumers are harmed.
C. Transparency
Finally, gag clauses display how opaque the PBM system is. Gag
clauses are often coupled with broad rules regarding anti-disparagement or
confidentiality, which makes it impossible for the gagged party to give any
indication a gag clause is in effect.114 For example, one pharmacist landed
himself in trouble with a PBM because discussing alternative ways to
purchase a prescription breached the contract for “disparaging the plan.”115
Gag clauses themselves are a form of confidentiality clause, which
prohibits any kind of conversation about pricing.116 Hence, the problem is
circular—not only is a pharmacist unable to tell a consumer about a
cheaper option due to a gag clause, but the pharmacist may also be unable
to discuss the constraints he or she is under as it could be viewed as
disparaging.117 This is problematic because consumers are unaware of the
restrictions placed on the pharmacist and are otherwise under the
impression a pharmacist is loyal to them and not an unknown third-party
entity. The public suffers because pharmacists are unable to discuss the
agreements that bind them.

113

See Swichar & Wasser, supra note 111.
Shannon Firth, Proposed House Bill Seeks to End Drug Price ‘Gag Clause,’
MEDPAGE TODAY (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealthpolicy/heal
thpolicy/74942.
115
Id.
116
Deanna Dewberry, NYS Exposed: Insured Patients Could be Paying Too Much for
Prescriptions, WHEC (Mar. 9, 2018, 7:07 AM), https://www.whec.com/news/insuredpatients-could-be-paying-too-much-for-prescriptions/4818961/.
117
See Mary Caffrey & Allison Inserro, Senate Votes 98-2 to Ban Pharmacist Gag
Clauses, AJMC (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.ajmc.com/newsroom/senate-votes-982-toban-pharmacist-gag-clauses (“The PBM stated we were in violation of our contract for
disparaging the plan when we discussed the cost of a drug off insurance.”); Local
Pharmacist Hugh Chancy in the White House, Champions Patients, VALDOSTATODAY.COM
(Oct. 16, 2018), http://valdostatoday.com/news-2/local/2018/10/local-pharmacist-hughchancy-goes-to-white-house/ [hereinafter Local Pharmacist] (“[I]f we said anything to
disparage the plan or patient [drug] pricing then we were in violation.”).
114
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The method for negotiating contracts is also suspicious and little is
known the process because PBMs have the upper hand. Pharmacies,
particularly independent pharmacies, generally do not have the means to
compete with big business.118 Often, a neighborhood pharmacy will be
independently managed by an individual, or small group, whose
responsibilities range from administering medication to reconciling budget
sheets and paying to keep the lights on at the end of the month. In order to
protect themselves, small pharmacies will participate in a Pharmacy
Services Administration Organization (“PSAO”), which is a group of
independent pharmacies that have banned together to leverage bargaining
power.119 Even so, a PBM is better situated to refuse a contract than an
independent pharmacy, especially when the PBM community is so small
and there is not an abundance of choice.120 For instance, the power wielded
by the Big Three is imposing—”[i]f you’re outed by just one network out
of these three, you could lose your entire business, and those patients lose
access to a pharmacy they may have frequented for decades.”121
In general, the contracting process with PBMs lacks transparency,
which disadvantages pharmacists who do not have access to information
about the party they are negotiating with or resources that would make the
dealings more level.122 One pharmacist describes the situation: “People
think we [pharmacists] can negotiate the contracts,” but in reality, PBMs
118
See Give Independent Pharmacies Leverage Against Take-it Or-Leave-it PBM
Contracts, NCPA: NAT’L COMMUNITY PHARMACISTS ASS’N, http://www.ncpanet.org/pdf/leg
/one_pager_hr_1188.pdf, (last visited Sept. 10, 2018).
119
Id.
120
A possible rebuttal to these contracts being considered adhesion contracts is the fact
that pharmacists are not forced into contracting with any particular PBM if at all, and the
purchasing of a plan can be likened to caveat emptor or “buyer beware.” Dean Celia,
Negotiating and Contracting with Pharmacy Benefits Managers, MANAGED HEALTH CARE
CONNECT: PHARMACY NEWS 1, 1 (May 24, 2018), https://www.managedhealthcareconnect.c
om/article/negotiating-and-contracting-pharmacy-benefits-managers.
Still, individuals
“with little to no bargaining power may limit ability to negotiate away from a PBM’s
standard contract.” Id. One pharmacist explains the dilemma, “I will admit, we freely sign
those contracts because without it people will not come to us without having us file their
insurance.” Dewberry, supra note 116.
121
Firozi, supra note 11.
122
Celia, supra note 120. These contracts could be defined as adhesion contracts due to
their “take-it or leave-it” nature. See Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed.
1999). An adhesion contract is defined as “a standard-form contract prepared by one party,
to be signed by the party in a weaker position . . . who has little choice about the terms.” Id.
Moreover, the lack of available information about PBM practices restricts a pharmacist’s
ability to make judgments about the contract. This could potentially invoke questions about
unconscionability. Paul Bennett Marrow, Contractual Unconscionability: Identifying and
Understanding Its Potential Elements, N.Y. ST. B.J.18, 22 (2000) (describing
unconscionability to include “unfair surprise,” which is “when the real meaning of its terms
are intentionally obscured from one of the parties, thereby precluding the complainant from
making a reasoned choice.”).
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“give us a contract and we take it or leave it.”123 These “take-it-or-leave-it
contracts” offer no opportunity to negotiate, and they employ punitive
conditions, which allow PBMs to freely audit pharmacies.124 These audits
are then used to extract money based on minor technicalities, which can be
crippling to a small pharmacy.125
PBMs are not required to share information about their contracting
practices.126 But, the issue with transparency goes beyond contracting. The
overall lack of transparency implicates concerns about other business
practices. For example, the lack of information leads to concerns about
how rebates and discounts are structured.127 Ultimately, the secretive
nature of PBMs allows them to implement business practices that are not
always in the best interest of consumers. Due to the lack of transparency, it
is not always readily apparent harm has occurred.
V. THE PROHIBITION OF GAG CLAUSES AND OTHER INITIATIVES TO
INCREASE TRANSPARENCY AND LOWER DRUG COSTS
Gag clause legislation has gained significant attention in the past few
years and was recently a focus at both the state and federal level. States
opted to take various approaches to gag clauses and have had varying
success in passing such legislation.128 The federal government similarly
decided to take action and was successful in passing legislation prohibiting
the use of gag clauses.129 The motivation to pass these anti-gag clause laws
derived from legislative concern that opaque cost-only practices harmed
consumers without adding any public benefit.
A. Legislation at the State Level
Gag clause legislation at the state level has been around for many
years.130 Most of the traction regarding states opting to take action against
123

Local Pharmacist, supra note 117.
Dayen, supra note 32.
125
Id.
126
See Michael Carrier, A Six-Step Solution to the PBM Problem, HEALTH AFF. (Aug.
30, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180823.383881/full/ (“PBM
agreements are audited in secure rooms with few contracts reviewed, restricted notetaking,
and only client-specific information . . . .”).
127
See Jane Horvath, New NASHP Model Legislation Helps States Bring Transparency
to Pharmacy Benefits Managers, NASHP (Aug. 28, 2018), https://nashp.org/new-nashpmodel-legislation-helps-states-bring-transparency-to-pharmacy-benefit-managers/.
128
See infra text accompanying notes 131–144.
129
See infra text accompanying notes 148–163.
130
The Employer Retirement Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) “preempts any state law
that may or does ‘relate to any employee benefit plan’ regulated by ERISA.” Albert Feuer,
When do State Laws Determine ERISA Plan Benefit Rights?, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 145,
162 (2014). Since gag clause legislation at the state level may potentially impact ERISA,
124
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gag clauses, however, was gained around 2016 and came to a head in
2018.131 Between 2016 and 2018, at least twenty-six states enacted laws
from a grouping of roughly forty-one states, all of which considered
legislation to prohibit gag clauses.132 This was a noteworthy trend because
“[s]tates are sovereign entities; they don’t work in tandem.”133 Moreover,
not only were the states working in parallel, but gag clause efforts were not
contained to the acts of one political party and instead transcended party
lines.134 Ultimately, collective sentiment at the state level overwhelmingly
pointed to banning gag clauses.
Lawmakers were clear, they disliked gag clauses because they harmed
constituents. Senator Martin Looney, on the issue of gag clauses, stated,
“This is information consumers should have . . . but they were denied under
somewhat arbitrary and capricious contracts that pharmacists were required
to abide by.”135 Accordingly, the goal for lawmakers when passing gag
clause legislation was to advocate against the practice as their use was
collectively viewed as unfair and deceptive.
There has not been any one specific way to address the issue. In
tackling gag clauses, states have addressed the problem in a variety of
different ways, whether they choose an outright ban on the practice,
increased transparency, a requirement for additional documentation, or a
mixture of several different aims.136 The most basic approach is an outright
ban. This is achieved by either explicitly stating gag clauses cannot be
utilized in contracting or, alternatively, permitting pharmacists to inform
consumers about the availability of a lower cost, regardless of whether a
gag clause is contained in the contract.137 Several states have elected to go
there is question whether ERISA’s gag clause preemption clause is triggered. This
Comment will not explore the impact ERISA had/has on state legislators as they drafted gag
clause legislation.
131
Richard Cauchi, Prohibiting PBM “Gag Clauses” that Restrict Pharmacists from
Disclosing Price Options: Recent State Legislation 2016-2018, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 1, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Health/Pharmacist
_Gag_clauses-2018-14523.pdf.
132
Id.; see also Jay Phillips, A 50 State Scan: States Move to Protect Healthcare
Consumers by Prohibiting Gag Clauses on Pharmacists, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS: JAY
PHILLIP’S BLOG (July 3, 2018, 9:59 AM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/50state-scan-states-move-protect-healthcare-consumers-prohibiting-gag-clauses-pharmacists.
133
Povich, supra note 1 (Richard Cauchi, the health program director for the National
Conference of State Legislatures, on the surge of states enacting gag clause legislation as a
bipartisan initiative).
134
See, e.g., H.B. 1791, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2018) (enacted) (sponsored by
Representative Butler (D), Representative Rosenwald (D), Representative Williams (D),
Representative Forthergill (R), Representative Knirk (D)).
135
Pear, supra note 14.
136
See infra text accompanying notes 137–144.
137
See, e.g., S.B. 3104, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018) (failed); S.B. 576, 2018 Gen.
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this route, and while some have been successful, other proposals have
failed.138
In contrast, other states have approached gag clauses by challenging
the practice directly while simultaneously focusing on additional initiatives
to curb gag clauses via additional PBM regulations.139 For example,
California has prohibited a formulary from containing more than four
tiers.140 The state has also made it a requirement that if there is a difference
in price between a prescription’s retail price and the consumer’s applicable
copay/coinsurance, the consumer will be charged the lesser amount.141
Comparatively, Nevada law has prohibited PBMs from restricting a
pharmacist’s ability to provide information regarding payment, drug
efficiency, or the availability of a cheaper alternative, and the state further
restricts PBMs from penalizing pharmacists who choose to provide the
information to consumers.142 Nevada has also established transparency and
recording requirements for prescription drug costs and pricing.143
These are only two examples out of many, but they represent different
approaches available to states aiming to take on gag clauses. Ultimately,
each state must choose the approach that best fits its constituency.
Nevertheless, it appears that more states have had success at passing
legislation when compared to those who have not.144 At the heart of it,
states are driven by a desire to protect their citizens, and gag clauses do
anything but.
B. Legislation at the Federal Level
Like state governments, the federal government has been vocal in its
opposition to gag clauses. This has been a shared objective between the
executive and legislative branches. In the House, Representative Earl
“Buddy” Carter introduced the Know the Cost Act on September 13,
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018) (enacted); H.B. 426, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2018)
(failed).
138
See, e.g., S.B. 3104, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018) (failed); S.B. 576, 2018 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018) (enacted); H.B. 426, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2018)
(failed).
139
See infra text accompanying notes 141–143.
140
S.B. 1021, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (enacted).
141
Cauchi, supra note 131; see also S.B. 1021, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018)
(enacted); Senator Weiner Introduces Dug Co-pay Bill to Permanently Protect Consumers
from Price Gouging, SCOTT WEINER REPRESENTING CAL. SENATE DISTRICT 11, (Feb. 8,
2018), https://sd11.senate.ca.gov/news/20180208-senator-wiener-introduces-drug-co-paybill-permanently-protect-consumers-price-gouging.
142
Cauchi, supra note 131; see also S.B. 539, 29th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017)
(enacted).
143
Id.
144
See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 132.

ENG(DO NOT DELETE)

1200

4/22/2020 2:31 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1179

2018.145 Representative Carter spoke about the impact gag clauses have
had on his role as a pharmacist.146 He shared his frustration that practices,
such as gag clauses, continually harm consumers and challenged the role of
PBMs indicating, “They bring no value whatsoever.”147
The Senate introduced two bills. First, the Patient Right to Know
Drug Prices Act, which Senator Collins introduced on March 14, 2018.148
Senator Collins described the need to act stating, “Multiple reports have
exposed how this egregious practice has harmed consumers, such as one
customer who used his insurance to pay $129 for a drug when he could
have paid $18 out of pocket.”149 The law is meant to “prohibit an insurer or
pharmacy benefit manager from restricting a pharmacy’s ability to provide
drug price information to a plan enrollee when there is a difference
between the cost of the drug under the plan and the cost of the drug when
purchased without insurance.”150 This bill focuses on plans offered through
exchanges and by private employers.151
On the same day, Senator Debbie Stanebow introduced a second bill,
the Know the Lowest Price Act.152 This bill is virtually identical to Senator
Collin’s bill with the exception that it refers to individuals receiving
coverage under Medicare.153
Senator Stanebow’s motivation for
introducing the bill was much like Senator Collin’s—protecting
Americans.154 And like at the state level, both bills were a bipartisan effort

145

Know the Lowest Cost Act, H.R. 6733, 115th Cong. (2018).
Firozi, supra note 11.
147
Id. President Trump acknowledged Representative Carter during the signing of the
two bills regarding gag clauses that originated in the Senate. Jessie Hellman, Trump Signs
Bills Banning Drug Pricing ‘Gag Clauses,’ HILL (Oct. 10, 2018, 2:47 PM),
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/410813-trump-signs-bills-banning-drug-pricing-gagclauses.
148
Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act, S. 2554, 115th Cong. (2018).
149
Senator Collins, McCaskill, Stabenow Lead Bipartisan Group of Senators in
Introducing Legislation to Prohibit “Gag Clauses” That Cause Consumers to Pay Higher
Prescription Drugs, SUSAN COLLINS: U.S. SENATOR ME., (Mar. 15, 2018, 1:10 PM),
https://www.collins.senate.gov/newsroom/senators-collins-mccaskill-stabenow-leadbipartisan-group-senators-introducing-legislation (Senator Collins in a press release
regarding gag clause legislation).
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Know the Lowest Price Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-262, § 2553, 132 Stat. 3670
(2018).
153
Id.
154
See Mary Caffrey & Allison Inserro, Senate Votes 98-2 to Ban Pharmacist Gag
Clauses, AJMC (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.ajmc.com/newsroom/senate-votes-982-toban-pharmacist-gag-clauses (“Patients should have the right to know if they can save money
by paying cash out-of-pocket rather than using their insurance and their pharmacists should
have the right to tell them.”).
146
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and garnered widespread support in Congress.155
Not only have legislators voiced their dislike for gag clauses, so has
the President.
President Trump, and by extension, the Trump
Administration, have been vocal about the issue. On May 11, 2018, the
Administration released “American Patients First: The Trump
Administration Blueprint to Lower Prices and Reduce Out-of-Pocket
Costs” (“American Patients First”), which enumerated the prohibition of
gag clauses as a priority.156 The President further voiced his support
through Twitter: “Americans deserve to know the lowest drug price at their
pharmacy, but ‘gag clauses’ prevent your pharmacist from telling you! I
support legislation that will remove gag clauses and urge the Senate to act.
#AmericanPatientsFirst.”157 Similarly, the President’s Secretary of Health
and Human Services, Alex Azar, has also expressed a personal
commitment to outlawing gag clauses.158 He praised Senator Collins in her
efforts to eliminate gag clauses and indicated he was committed to working
with her in further achieving her objective.159
On October 10, 2018, President Trump signed the two Senate bills,
the Patient Right to Know Act and the Know the Lowest Price Act, into
law.160 During the signing, the President indicated, “It’s way out of whack

155

See id. (describing how the Senate passed the Patient Right to Know Act 98-2 after
the Know the Lowest Price Act had been passed the week prior); A Six-Step Solution to the
PBM Problem, HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180823.383881/full/ (indicating that one
bill was introduced by a Republican while the other was introduced by a Democrat).
156
American Patients First: The Trump Administration Blueprint to Lower Drug Prices
and Reduce Out-of-Pocket Costs 1, 25 (May 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/
AmericanPatientsFirst.pdf [hereinafter American Patients First] (“Prohibit Part D plan
contracts from preventing pharmacists from telling patients when they could pay less out-ofpocket by not using their insurance—also known as pharmacy gag clauses.”); President
Donald J. Trump’s Blueprint to Lower Drug Prices, (May 11, 2018) https://www.whitehous
e.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-blueprint-lower-drug-prices/
(“Prohibit Part D contracts that include ‘gag rules’ that prevent pharmacists from informing
patients when they could pay less out-of-pocket by not using insurance.”).
157
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 17, 2018, 2:10 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1041751173034848260?lang=en.
158
Alex M. Azar, Remarks on Value-Based Transformation to the Federation of
American Hospitals, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (March 5, 2018), https://www.hhs.g
ov/about/leadership/secretary/speeches/2018-speeches/remarks-on-value-based-transformati
on-to-the-federation-of-american-hospitals.html (sharing how he had personally been
affected by the lack of transparency in healthcare pricing during an address to the American
Federation of Hospitals).
159
Secretary Azar Pledges to Work With Senator Collins on Legislation to Prohibit Gag
Clauses That Cause Consumers to Overpay Medications, SUSAN COLLINS: U.S. SENATOR
ME. (June 16, 2018) https://www.collins.senate.gov/newsroom/secretary-azar-pledges-worksenator-collins-legislation-prohibit-gag-clauses-cause.
160
Clark & Breslauer, supra note 18.
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[drug pricing]. It’s way too high.”161 He then continued, “It’s a big win for
patients . . . . It’s a big win for patients in terms of allowing pharmacists to
openly discuss medication prices to save patients money and health care
costs.”162 Secretary Azar further indicated there is “more to come” in
reference to fixing transparency in pricing and high costs and that the
Administration was ready to take on “anybody that [it] need[s] to take
on.”163 Nonetheless, while gag clause legislation was a crucial first step,
many of the issues revealed by gag clauses are still prevalent. Thus, there
is still much more that needs to be done to offer better protection to
consumers.
VI. LIFTING THE GAG—NOW WHAT?
While there are many reasons why gag clause legislation came to
fruition, the ultimate goal was to protect consumers better. The legislation
achieves this objective to a certain extent, but many problems still remain.
The gag clause story reveals deeply rooted issues within the PBM system
regarding fiduciary duties, conflicts of interest, and transparency—all of
which steadfastly remain post-gag clause legislation. With gag clauses a
thing of the past, the discussion now turns on the future. According to
President Trump, “We’re very much eliminating the middlemen. The
middlemen became very, very rich, right? Whoever those middlemen
were—and a lot of people never even figured it out—they’re rich. They
won’t be so rich anymore.”164 The middlemen are PBMs. It is unclear
whether President Trump has true intentions of eliminating PBMs, and it is
unlikely this would ever occur.165 Regardless, the focus should not solely
be that PBMs have money but rather why and what it means for consumers.
The existence of gag clauses arguably had, and would continue to
have, no bearing on the high cost of drugs.166 Pricing is based on numerous
factors such as the list price and the outcome of negotiations between
161

Id.
Id.
163
Brittany Shoot, Trump Signs 2 Drug Pricing Bills, HHS Secretary Promises ‘More to
Come,’ FORTUNE (Oct. 11, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/10/11/trump-administration-gagclause-compare-prescription-prices/.
164
Nathaniel Weixel, Defending the ‘Middlemen’ in the Battle on Drug Prices, HILL
(May 15, 2018, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/lobbyist-profiles/387669defending-the-middlemen.
165
Interestingly, there is discussion regarding whether there could be a system without
PBMs. See Sally Welborn & Pramod John, Imagine There Are No PBMs. It’s Easy if You
Try, STAT (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/08/23/pbms-rebates-drugpurchasing/.
166
Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States
Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 860 (2016) (“[T]he US health care
system allows manufacturers to set their own price for a given product.”).
162
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manufacturers and a wholesaler or PBM.167 With or without a gag clause,
prices are “set extraordinarily high.”168 Ultimately, the root issue is not
addressed since the “price” otherwise remains the same regardless of the
savings realized—not only does consumer cost need to be lowered, so do
drug prices.169 Namely, a $100 prescription remains $100 regardless of
how much the consumer pays out-of-pocket (gag clause or otherwise).
Likewise, the gag generally did not hinder the sharing of information, it
just barred a pharmacist from initiating a conversation about price—a
consumer was always free to ask if there were ways to save. Therefore, the
issue of cost runs much deeper than just the gag clause itself. Rather, the
PBM system has made it possible for situations like gag clauses to occur.
While it is possible the elimination of gag clauses may have
significant effects on individuals depending on their specific situation, it is
unlikely the legislation will affect a large portion of the population in a
meaningful way or protect against other predatory practices. Banning gag
clauses without doing more is like putting a bandage on a wound that
requires stitches. The effort to curb high drug costs and better protect
consumers requires a much larger and longer conversation from the
industry and lawmakers. First, lawmakers should look to see how gag
clause legislation could be fortified. Second, lawmakers should look
beyond gag clauses, consider how else consumers are harmed by PBMs,
and seek to reform the structure that allowed gag clauses to be such a
commonplace practice. Lawmakers have the ability to amend the PBM
system and ultimately protect consumers, but they need to take the
initiative.170
A. Strengthening Gag Clause Legislation
Gag clause legislation is integral to ensuring the practice ceases to
exist, although further inspection shows there is room for legislators to take
a stronger stance when it comes to protecting consumers. The federal
167

Wapner, supra note 62.
Id.
169
See Robert King, House Panel Advances Bill to Counter ‘Gag Clauses’ that Lead to
Higher Drug Prices, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 7, 2018, 10:31 AM), https://www.washington
examiner.com/policy/healthcare/house-panel-advances-bill-to-counter-gag-clauses-thatlead-to-higher-drug-prices.
170
The subsequent discussion largely reflects how states could directly legislate to
counteract problematic PBM practices. More specifically, however, have been approaches
by certain states to regulate PBMs through the state’s insurance department. See, e.g., S.B.
1504, 129th Leg., 1 Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019); Sarah Lanford, Montana Explores a New
Approach to Regulating Pharmacy Benefit Managers, NASHP (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://nashp.org/montana-explores-a-new-approach-to-regulating-pharmacy-benefitmanagers/. The use of a state’s insurance department’s regulatory authority is outside the
scope of this Comment.
168
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legislation only prohibits the use of gag clauses and offers no further
protection.171 Just because a consumer is able to immediately save some
money at the pharmacy counter by paying out-of-pocket with the
elimination of gag clauses, does not mean the consumer will actually save
money in the long run; the consumer still needs to be aware of how his or
her insurance plan is structured due to other factors that affect out-ofpocket costs.172
A pharmacist no longer bound by a gag clause may opt to tell a
consumer he or she may save by paying out-of-pocket and forgoing
insurance. To most, this sounds like an obvious choice—save the money
and pay the cheaper price—however, there is more to consider. For
instance, some individuals need to pay a pharmacy deductible before the
insurer begins to pay.173 The more often an individual chooses to pay outof-pocket, the less likely he or she will pay off the deductible since insurers
have no obligation to count these payments towards the deductible.174 In
other words, the deductible may take longer to pay off, and this means
more dollars spent before insurance will apply. Unless an individual is
diligently tracking his or her savings every time the decision is made not to
pay through the insurer, the individual may not actually be saving money.
Put differently, saving a few dollars today does not necessarily translate to
saving money in the future. The gag clause legislation does not require
out-of-pocket costs to be counted towards deductibles, which could result
in today’s savings being tomorrow’s burden. Consumer protections would
be much stronger if the law required that lower costs be counted towards
deductibles. California’s gag clause legislation, for example, contains this

171
See Know the Lowest Price Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-262, § 2553, 132 Stat.
3670 (2018); Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act, Pub. L. No. 115-263, § 2554, 132
Stat. 3672 (2018).
172
See supra text accompanying notes 173–174.
173
Amadeo, supra note 59 (“The deductible. That’s what you pay before the insurance
company contributes a dime.”). Pharmacy deductibles function the same way as a standard
deductible and have grown in popularity amongst insurers. See generally Emergence and
Impact of Pharmacy Deductibles: Implications for Patients in Commercial Health Plans,
IQVIA: IMS INST. HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Sept. 2015), https://www.iqvia.com//media/iqvia/pdfs/institute-reports/emergence-and-impact-of-pharmacy-deductibles.pdf?la=
en&hash=1D397351342823EDEFDECFC4F119CCBFD56E904F
(discussing
the
emergence of pharmacy deductibles).
174
Dickson & Chester, supra note 89 (“[M]onies paid outside an insurance plan may
not count toward the patient’s deductible or out-of-pocket spending limit.”); see also
Elizabeth Davis, What Counts Toward Your Health Insurance Deductible?, VERYWELL
HEALTH (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.verywellhealth.com/what-counts-toward-your-healthinsurance-deductible-1738559 (“Money you pay out-of-pocket for health care services that
aren’t a covered benefit of your health insurance won’t be credited toward your health
insurance deductible.”).
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requirement.175
In addition, the gag clause legislation does not require pharmacists to
initiate a conversation regarding lower drug prices.176 Instead, it is left to
each pharmacist’s personal discretion whether he or she would like to say
something.177 Since there are no protections to ensure consumers are
actually told the lowest price, they may be left in the same situation as they
were prior to the legislation being passed, i.e. still having to ask whether
there is a lower priced alternative. Moreover, the issue that many
consumers are unlikely to think of medication as having a negotiable price
still stands, which means they will not prompt the cost conversation
themselves because “the act of asking the question [‘what is the cash
price?’] requires a level of health care literacy which many patients do not
possess.”178 Federal or uniform state legislation would be more effective if
it required pharmacists to make disclosures about the price to consumers.179
In California, “pharmacists are not just allowed to tell patients when lower
prices are available, but are required to tell them about those cost
savings.”180 As of now, California is an outlier, but if federal and/or state
lawmakers were to adopt the California approach, consumers would be
better protected.
Even further, the law could prohibit a consumer from paying more
than the cash price, if the cash price is the lowest price available. This
would ensure the consumer is paying the lowest possible price every single
time he or she goes into the pharmacy. No longer would the consumer or
pharmacist have to initiate conversation; instead, the savings would be
compulsory. Once again, California put a safeguard like this in place to
ensure its citizens are able to realize savings whenever possible.181 This
sort of law, however, would be most effective when coupled with a law that
175
Lisa L. Gill, Trump Signs Bills Banning ‘Gag Clauses,’ Helping Consumers Save on
Drugs, CONSUMER REP. (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/drug-prices/trum
p-signs-bill-banning-gag-clauses-helping-consumers-save-on-drugs/.
176
See Know the Lowest Prices Act of 2018 § 2553; Patient Right to Know Drug Prices
Act § 2554.
177
See Know the Lowest Prices Act of 2018 § 2553; Patient Right to Know Drug Prices
Act § 2554.
178
Hayward K. Zwerling, Drug Costs at Pharmacies Lack Transparency,
COMMONWEALTH (Oct. 19, 2018), https://commonwealthmagazine.org/opinion/drug-costsat-pharmacies-lack-transparency/.
179
Regulation of a profession in this manner would usually be a matter of state law. See
U.S. Const. amend. X; see also Ronald L. Scott, Cybermedicine and Virtual Pharmacies,
103 W. VA. L. REV. 407, 476 (2001) (“[P]harmacists are licensed by the states for the
practice of pharmacy within a state’s boarders, federal law also regulates aspects of the
practice of pharmacy.”). As such, regulation such as the one proposed would most likely
come from the states rather than the federal government.
180
Gill, supra note 175.
181
Cauchi, supra note 131.
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requires out-of-pocket payments be counted for insurance purposes.
Otherwise, such a law could have a negative impact and achieve the exact
opposite of what is intended.182
B. The Future of “Those Middlemen”: Other Legislative
Considerations
Gag clauses can be viewed as a small-scale representation of much
larger issues. Even though gag clauses are gone, many of the problems that
legislators and challengers highlighted still remain relevant. Issues
regarding fiduciary duties, conflicts of interest, and transparency are as
prevalent as ever and continue to be problematic aspects of PBMs. If
legislators want to protect consumers, they must move beyond gag clauses
and take stronger positions against questionable PBM practices, the very
practices that allowed gag clauses to flourish.
In May 2018, the Trump Administration issued American Patients
First, a blueprint for lowering drug prices and reducing out-of-pocket
costs.183 As part of the initiative to lower out-of-pocket costs, President
Trump cited the elimination of gag clauses.184 The President’s plan then
went on to list additional opportunities to make improvements regarding
transparency and easier access to pricing although he failed to offer a
comprehensive plan.185 In response, the minority staff of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance issued the report, “A Tangled Web: An Examination
of the Drug Supply and Payment Chain” (“A Tangled Web”).186 The report
challenged American Patients First indicating the ideas it proposed were
“simply not sufficient to reduce costs significantly for Americans[,]” and
further, a “majority of the President’s plan posed questions rather than
solutions.”187 The report is framed as a call to action, describing how
complex and broken the system is; yet it does not extend solutions itself.188
Moving forward, legislators on both sides should consider the following if
they intend to better protect consumers.
1. Fiduciary Duties
A recurring issue with PBM transactions is that it is unclear who owes
whom what duties or, alternatively, if there are even duties owed to begin
with. As it currently stands, PBMs do not owe fiduciary duties to plan
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

See supra text accompanying notes 173–175.
American Patients First, supra note 156.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 11.
A Tangled Web, supra note 49, at ii.
A Tangled Web, supra note 49, at x.
A Tangled Web, supra note 49, at 45.
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participants.189 While PBMs are tasked with negotiating benefits, they
have no duty to ensure those benefits are actually beneficial. American
Patients First discusses the lack of fiduciary duties.190 The blueprint
appears to contemplate the possibility of PBMs as fiduciaries by briefly
mentioning “fiduciary dut[ies] for pharmacy benefit managers,” but it does
not explain what this would entail.191 Presumably, the idea is that the PBM
would have a fiduciary obligation to the plan, which would mean the PBM
has a fiduciary obligation to the consumer.192 A PBM with a fiduciary
obligation to the consumer would have to act in the consumer’s best
interest.
This means the consumer’s interests would actually be
represented by the PBM and be reflected in the PBM’s business practices.
In the situation of gag clauses, PBMs had no obligation to act in the interest
of plan participants. As such, gag clauses were perfectly permissible.
The solution to this issue does not have to be complex—legislators
can impose fiduciary responsibilities on PBMs. Essentially, PBMs would
have an obligation to look out for the well-being of plan participants. Such
a law would prevent another gag clause situation from occurring because
the PBM would have to act with the best interest of the consumer in mind.
The PBM, at all times, would be required to meaningfully consider the
impact of its actions on the consumer, whether it be during the negotiation
of discount, while crafting the formulary, etc. In 2003, Maine first
addressed PBMs and fiduciary duties.193 The state passed the Unfair
Prescription Drug Practices Act, which imposed fiduciary duties upon
PBMs.194 The law stated, a PBM “owes a fiduciary duty to a covered entity
and shall discharge that duty in accordance with the provisions of state and
federal law.”195 It continued, “A pharmacy benefits manager shall perform
its duties with care, skill, prudence and diligence and in accordance with
189
Generally, PBMs are not regarded to as fiduciaries. There are also examples of
courts finding that PBMs are not fiduciaries. See, e.g., In re Express Scripts/Anthem
ERISA Litig., 285 F. Supp. 3d 655, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding a PBM was not a
fiduciary); In re Express Scripts, Inc., No. 1672, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65168, at *18 (E.D.
Mo. Sep. 13, 2006) (holding a PBM was not a fiduciary under ERISA).
190
American Patients First, supra note 156, at 33.
191
Id.
192
David Balto, Reigning in the Opaque Practices of PBMs and Payers is Long
Overdue, HILL (July 16, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/397320reigning-in-the-opaque-practices-of-pbms-and-payers-is-long-overdue.
193
Thomas Sullivan, Maine Set to Repeal Unfair Prescription Drug Prices Act and End
PBM
Discrimination,
POL’Y
&
MED.
(May
5,
2018),
https://www.policymed.com/2011/06/maine-set-to-repeal-unfair-prescription-drug-pricesact-and-end-pbm-discrimination.html.
194
22 M.R.S. § 2699 (repealed 2011). The National Academy for State and Health
Policy (“NASHP”) drafted a model act for PBMs. A MODEL ACT RELATING TO PHARMACY
BENEFIT MANAGERS (NASHP 2018).
195
22 M.R.S. § 2699(2) (repealed 2011).
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the standards of conduct applicable to a fiduciary in an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims.”196
The Maine law has since been repealed, and those in favor of repeal
argued the law “discouraged PBMs from doing business in the state, which
was resulting in less competition and higher drug prices.”197 Part of what
was notable about the gag clause movement was the overwhelming
consensus across state lines that action needed to be taken. The same
cannot be said for laws regarding fiduciary duties. If legislation were to be
passed at the federal level, situations like Maine’s would not occur—if
PBMs owe fiduciary duties in every state, no one state would be seen as
less desirable.198
The Trump Administration has thought about implementing fiduciary
obligations, yet it remains silent about where it currently stands.199 Not
only would codifying fiduciary duties deter PBMs from partaking in
practices that are harmful to consumers, it would also establish a
mechanism to hold PBMs accountable when they fail to put American
patients first. Moreover, it would add clarity to the system. One of the
system’s problematic features is that it is not always clear who is serving
whom, whose interests are the priority, and at what cost. Legislation
imposing fiduciary duties would help solve these uncertainties and better
protect consumers.
2. Conflicts of Interest
Not once does the word “conflict” appear in American Patients First,
yet the PBM system is inundated with conflicts of interest.200 One
particular source of concern is the rebate and discount system. A rebate is
a percentage of the price a PBM receives after a drug is dispensed and the
pharmacy is reimbursed.201 “[T]he typical PBM business model appears to
have a very basic conflict of interest” because “the higher the price, the
196

Id. § 2699(2)(A).
Sullivan, supra note 193. DC also attempted to pass a law to hold PBMs as
fiduciaries; however, a DC Appeals Court found that Title II of the Act, which contained the
language regarding fiduciary duties, was preempted by ERISA. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n
v. D.C., 613 F.3d 179, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2010); AccessRx Act of 2004, 2003 Bill Text DC B.
569. Interestingly, the First Circuit Court of Appeals previously held Maine’s PBM law was
not preempted by ERISA. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 301 (1st Cir.
2005). Thus, there is a circuit split regarding whether state law imposing fiduciary duties on
PBMs conflicts with ERISA. The Supreme Court declined to review Rowe. Supreme Court
Lets Stand Maine Law Regulating Pharmacy Benefit Managers, INS. J. (June 7, 2008),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2006/06/07/69265.htm.
198
This would also circumvent ERISA issues.
199
See American Patients First, supra note 156, at 33.
200
Id. Although it is somewhat alluded to in the section discussing fiduciary duties. Id.
201
Horvath, supra note 38.
197
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higher the rebate.”202 As such, the PBM has an incentive to drive up prices,
which directly conflicts with the PBM’s function of lowering costs for
consumers. Similarly, “the more units dispensed, the more revenue a PBM
gains.”203 This further adds to a PBM’s profit driven mentality, which
ultimately harms consumers because they are the ones that pay. Higher
revenue for a PBM correlates to higher drug prices, which is directly
proportional to higher prices for consumers.204
Conflicts of interest also arise when a PBM owns its own pharmacy
operation or, vice versa, when a pharmacy owns its own PBM.205 This is
often the result of vertical integration, which occurs when two different
levels of the supply chain consolidate and offer complementary products.206
In this situation, the PBM directs all of its business to its pharmacy
operation instead of exploring whether there is a more cost-efficient option
for its plan participants elsewhere.207 Once again, the PBM and the
consumer have misaligned priorities. Consumers want the lowest price, but
the PBM has no incentive to negotiate and instead forces the consumer to
use the PBM’s pharmacy.208 Consequently, consumers face further harm
because these partnerships may restrict their access to certain drugs or
hinder access to non-affiliate pharmacies.209 An example of this would be
if Caremark gave preference to CVS and its products instead of
aggressively negotiating with other pharmacies in order to secure better
deals for consumers.210
202

Id.
Id.
204
Id. (“While higher drug prices generate more net revenue for the PBM . . . consumers
end up paying more in higher prices.”).
205
Id.
206
Lisl J. Dunlop & Shoshana S. Speiser, Vertical Mergers: A Road Map for Success in
Healthcare Consolidation, MANATT (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.manatt.com/Insights/New
sletters/Health-Update/Vertical-Mergers-A-Road-Map-for-Success-in-Health?utm_campaig
n=Health%20Update%2010.23.18&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Eloqua.
207
Horvath, supra note 38.
208
Vertical integration is controversial. The American Medical Association (“AMA”)
recently opposed the merger of CVS Health and Aetna. Jennifer Bresnick, AMA: CVSAetna Merger Would Reduce PBM Competition, Raise Prices, HEALTHPAYER INTELLIGENCE
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://healthpayerintelligence.com/news/ama-cvs-aetna-merger-wouldreduce-pbm-competition-raise-prices. The AMA argued the merger would result in
anticompetitive practices and increased prices. Id.
209
Brian S. Feldman, Big Pharmacies are Dismantling the Industry that Keeps US Drug
Costs Even Sort-of Under Control, QUARTZ (Mar. 17, 2016), https://qz.com/636823/bigpharmacies-are-dismantling-the-industry-that-keeps-us-drug-costs-even-sort-of-undercontrol/.
210
This example is not to say this is or is not occurring between Caremark and CVS. In
fact, a spokesperson for CVS made the statement, “At our PBM, CVS/Caremark, we
welcome competition; indeed, our success is predicated on thriving competition in the
health care marketplace.” Id.
203
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It is unlikely lawmakers will be able to eradicate conflicts of interest
completely; however, the law could require PBMs to disclose conflicts.
Maine’s now defunct law that sought to impose fiduciary duties also
included a provision for disclosing conflicts of interest.211 The law
stipulated that a PBM “shall notify [a health carrier client] in writing of any
activity, policy, or practice of the [PBM] that directly or indirectly presents
any conflict of interest . . .”212 A law like this at the federal level would
afford more protection to consumers because a conflict of interest that is
fully disclosed is no longer an issue. Disclosure would mean consumers
are aware of factors that may be influencing their plan and would
subsequently be empowered to “consent” to the conflict or seek an
alternative provider who better suits their needs. Gag clauses were
problematic because they resulted in consumers paying higher out-ofpocket costs, and arguably more concerning, they were a secret. It is
important legislators address the secretive nature of PBMs that give rise to
conflicts of interest. Otherwise, consumers will suffer.
3. Transparency
PBMs are mysterious, elusive entities and part of what makes that
possible is the lack of transparency laws. In 2017, it was reported, “PBMs
[do not] reveal the prices they negotiate with their drug manufacturers even
to their insurance company partners,” which exemplifies the opacity of
practices.213 Furthermore, there are not many in a position of power to
challenge PBMs due to the complexity and lack of transparency. 214 When
it comes to consumers, “[f]ew can even understand how the system
works—only that [they are] paying through the nose—and those who do
[cannot] do anything about it.”215 It is this lack of transparency that
“enables PBMs to enjoy multiple hidden revenue streams” and avoid
accountability.216
The lack of information makes it impossible to decipher what a drug
actually costs versus what the PBM has decided it costs.217 One PBM

211

22 M.R.S. §2699 (repealed 2011).
Id. This is also the language that NASHP recommends for future legislation in its
sample act. NASHP, supra note 194.
213
William McConnell, Behind the War Between Health Insurers and Pharmacy Benefit
Managers, STREET (May 30, 2017, 7:45 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/14152766/1/
behind-the-war-between-health-insurers-and-pharmacy-benefit-managers.html.
214
See Ryan Cooper, The Secret Monopoly Behind America’s Outrageous Drug Prices,
WEEK (Mar. 29, 2017), https://theweek.com/articles/688826/secret-monopoly-behindamericas-outrageous-drug-prices.
215
Id.
216
Dayen, supra note 32.
217
See id.
212
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contract reserved “full authority to determine whether a drug is brand or
generic without being transparent” and stipulated the PBM could “pocket
the difference between a brand-drug discount and a generic-drug
discount.”218 If pricing information were readily available, it could
potentially deter PBMs from setting prices that are not within a reasonable
range. Even if a PBM did not change its practices, at the very least,
everyone would be able to see what the pricing actually looks like.
Gag clause legislation does nothing to increase accountability or
transparency—it only addresses one very specific problem. Separately,
various states have passed transparency laws to address this void and better
protect consumers. Some states have opted for license and registration
requirements while others have gone the route of disclosure requirements.
Arkansas took the former approach and signed a bill into law that requires
PBMs to be licensed in the state.219 Alternatively, Louisiana took the latter
approach.220 In Louisiana, PBMs are required to issue “an annual
transparency report that discloses aggregate data on rebates received from
drug manufacturers and administrative fees obtained from pharmacists.”221
Laws like these allow the government to more meaningfully regulate PBMs
and provide savvy consumers with an opportunity to make informed
decisions about their pharmacy coverage.
Despite growing concerns that PBMs add no value to the health care
system and may be the cause for rising prescription drug costs, it is
impossible to gauge whether this is true because of non-transparency.222
The Office of the Inspector General at Health and Human Services shared
this sentiment indicating, “The lack of transparency raises concerns that
218
Arielle Kane, The Problem with PBMs, PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST. (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.progressivepolicy.org/publications/the-problem-with-pbms/ (quoting Bob
Herman, Inside a Drug Pricing Contract, AXIOS (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.axios.com/in
side-express-scripts-pbm-contract8be2f09d-cbfa-4275-9855-7bc9c4fcc1a7.html).
219
S.B. 2, 91st Gen. Assemb., 2d Extraordinary Sess. (Ark. 2018); H.B. 1010, 91st Gen.
Assemb., 2d Extraordinary Sess. (Ark. 2018); Joshua Cohen, Improving Drug Price
Transparency: From Removing Pharmacy Gag Clauses to Reforming the Rebate System,
FORBES (Oct. 17, 2018, 7:27 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuacohen/2018/10/17/i
mproving-drug-price-transparency-from-removing-pharmacy-gag-clauses-to-reforming-therebate-system/#47aec202303b.
Other states have similarly adopted licensing and
registration requirements. See, e.g., S.B. 117, Gen. Assemb., 16 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2016); S.B.
1852, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018).
220
S. 282, Gen. Assemb., 2018 Reg. Sess. (La. 2018). Louisiana also has licensing
requirements. S. 283, Gen. Assemb., 2018 Reg. Sess. (La. 2018).
221
Cohen supra note 219; S. 283, Gen. Assemb., 2018 Reg. Sess. (La. 2018); see also
S. 282, Gen. Assemb., 2018 Reg. Sess. (La. 2018). Another example of a transparency
report can be found in Washington legislation. S.B. 5422, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2019).
222
Horvath, supra note 38.
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sponsors may not always have enough information to oversee the services
and information provided by PBMs.”223 To address this concern, the
federal government could adopt legislation that mirrors what the states
have done. Other suggestions include fixing drug prices over a contract
term, or even more radically, creating a national formulary that focuses on
price and transparency.224 A transparent PBM is not focused on rebates and
maximizing profit and is instead accountable to plan participants.
Unquestionably, the system needs to change in order to better serve
consumers, but proper amendments are impossible unless the system is
fully understood.225 Transparency laws are a necessary step to ensuring
American patients are actually put first.
VII. CONCLUSION
The discussion that has emerged regarding gag clauses is an important
one. Gag clause legislation is a crucial first step towards addressing
problems associated with rising health costs and PBMs, and it is a welcome
change to see political parties coming together to advance initiatives at both
the state and federal level. Nonetheless, banning gag clauses is not a real
solution for the issue is much larger. While efforts to block the practice of
gag clauses are commendable and fully appropriate considering the ethical
and public policy implications, it is unlikely their removal will make much
of a difference for Americans in the long run.226
With or without gag clauses, PBMs will continue to retain immense
power in the pharmaceutical industry. While the prohibition of gag clauses
could potentially save money in the short-term, there is no guarantee those
savings will carry into the long-term. With the advent of the pharmacy
deductible and other tactics in which PBMs can control an individual’s outof-pocket expenses over an extended period of time, this may be an
instance of immediate gratification overshadowing long-term injuries.
While the banning of gag clauses is an important first step, there is much
more that needs to be done to achieve the ultimate goal of lowering

223

Daniel R. Levinson, Concerns With Rebates in the Medicare Part D Program ii,
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN. (Mar. 2011), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/rep
orts/oei-02-08-00050.pdf.
224
Cohen, supra note 219; David Dayen, Want to Bring Down Drug Prices? Go After
the Middleman, AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 11, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/want-bringdown-drug-prices-go-after-middleman.
225
A Tangled Web, supra note 49, at 27 (“Without this information [about PBM
practices], identifying opportunities to balance the benefits PBMs offer with their potential
to drive up drug prices may be impossible.”).
226
In a poll conducted by Politico-Harvard, “81 percent [of Americans] favored
eliminating the gag clauses, but only 42 percent believed it would result in lower drug
prices.” Firozi, supra note 11.
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healthcare costs and better protecting Americans. Whether it is an
expansion of gag clause legislation to fortify its protections or subsequent
actions to counter other problematic practices and features of PBMs, more
must be done. Thus, the question “how much will it cost?” is still as
relevant as ever.

